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It is known that the informal sector size depends on the development level of a country. Table 1 pres-
ents estimates for the dimensionof the informal sector of selected countries. In the United States, esti-
mates suggest that the informal sector represents around 10 percent of the official Gross Domestic
Product. In Peru, for example, the informal sector is 60 percent of the official GDP, which means that
more than a third of this country’s total output (including the formal and informal sectors) is not
accounted for in official figures.
There is a set of countries, however, that seem to escapethis rule. These are developedcountriesthat
have an informal sector size comparable to that of less developed countries. Examples include Spain,
Greece, Italy and Portugal. In Portugal, for instance, it is estimated that almost a fifth of total national
output is produced outside the realm of official accounts.
A first question that one might ask is – how can we measure the informal sector weight in total econ-
omy? The literature describes several methods for tackling this issue. For example, Schneider and
Enste (2000) describe an approachused in areas withstrong industrial activity, whichconsists of mea-
suring the energy consumed in that area. If one knows the technologies used by the industrial units of
the area, based on actual energy consumption in that area it is possible to estimate the expected out-
put. Bycomparing this figure withthe output accountedfor in official figures, one is able to estimate the
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Informal sector (% of
official income per capita)
Official income per capita
(in 1999 USD)
Total income per capita
(in 1999 USD)
Denmark 9.4 32030 35041
Canada 14.8 19320 22179
Germany 13.2 25350 28696
France 13.8 23480 26720
United States 10.0 30600 33660
Belgium 15.3 24510 28260
Portugal 22.1 10600 12942
Spain 22.4 14000 17136
Italy 26.0 19710 24834
Argentina 21.8 7600 9257
Brazil 35.0 4420 5967
Peru 60.0 2390 3824
Nigeria 76.0 310 546
* The views of this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Banco de Portugal.
** Economic Research Department.
*** Purdue University and Pernambuco Federal University.
Table 1
DATA ON THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND INCOME FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES
Source: Antunes and Cavalcanti (2006).unofficialoutput.Asshouldbeexpected,themethodsvarywiththeactivitysectorthatoneisinterested
in.
The second important question, and the one that we shall address in this study, is – which factors de-
termine the size of the informal sector and the performance of the economy?Authors such as De Soto
(1989, 2000) have argued that barriers to activity in the formal sector create the conditions for a large
informal sector. Among these barriers, De Soto emphasizes the administrative fees and bribes paid to
bureaucrats. Other important factors include the tax burden imposed on firms, the absence or insuffi-
cient quality of public services, and the cultural environment.
From an economic viewpoint, the existence of an informal sector might not be deleterious for the effi-
ciency of the economy. After all, if people and firms are willing to operate outside the legal and institu-
tional protection inherent to the formal sector, that is because, operating unofficially, they expect to
havelargergainsthanwhattheywouldgetiftheyoperatedintheformalsector.If theaggregatebenefit
that all these people and firms get in informal activity exceeds the net benefit that their inclusion in the
formal sector would entail, then the economy as a whole will be better off.
1 However, the informal sec-
tordistortstheeconomyinseveraldifferentdimensions,andthismayleadtoattemptsatreducingit.
One of the distortions is that, by operating in the informal sector, it is difficult for an entrepreneur to use
his wealth as collateral for credit. By operating in the formal sector, any entrepreneur will have to pay
taxes and bear the cost of entry in the formal sector. However, he will have the great advantage of be-
ing ableto borrowunderlegallybindingcontracts, and presentinghis wealthas collateralfor credit. Le-
gal protection means that, in the case he wants to renege on his bank debt, he willlose a fraction of his
profits as an entrepreneur;this punishmentwillbe larger the larger the level of contract enforcement in
the economy. The possibility of borrowing and using collateral increases the potential scale of the
entrepreneur’s firm and improves the efficiency of the economy.
If, on the contrary, the entrepreneur decides to operate informally, he will not pay taxes or the costs of
operatingformally. However, hisaccessto creditwillbeseverelylimited.In somecases, hemighthave
to resort exclusivelyto his personalwealthin order to become entrepreneur. This balancebetweenthe
costsofformaloperationandthebenefitofeasyaccesstocreditwilldeterminethesectortheentrepre-
neur will operate in, as well as the scale of his project.
Another distortion is fiscal. By widening the fiscal base, the average tax burden could be alleviated.
Since, as we shall see, the best entrepreneurs operate with higher probability in the formal sector, any
reduction in the tax burden wouldtend to increase the average productivity of the overall economy (in-
cluding both the formal and the informal sector).
A third distortion is more subtle and has to do with the agents’ occupational choice. Before deciding
whichsectorhewilloperatein,theagenthastodecidewhetherhewillbeaworkeroranentrepreneur.
2
If hethinksthat hewillhavehigherincomeas a workerthanas anentrepreneur, giventhe interestrate,
the equilibrium wage rate and the agent’s ability as entrepreneur, his choice will be to become a
worker. The existence of barriers to become entrepreneur – whichgive rise to the informal sector – im-
plies that, instead of beingentrepreneurs,some agents become workers.This willtend to lowerwages
(because it increases the labour supply) and the entrepreneurs’costs, thereby increasing inequality in
the distribution of income.
This article describes a model economy that incorporates all these factors, namely: i) a formal as well
as an informal sector; ii) the possibility that formal firms borrow from credit institutions, unlike informal
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1 It shouldbenotedthat whenwethinkaboutthe informalsector wedonot meanthe exerciseof criminalactivities, but ratherthe exerciseof activitiesthat,
although outside the realm of legality, could be pursued in the formal sector.
2 The notion of “entrepreneur” is consistent with self-employed workers, as well as entrepreneurs in the usual sense.firms; iii)barriersto entryinthe formalsector suchas administrativecosts andpaymentof bribesto bu-
reaucrats and other agents; iv) endogenous sorting of agents among occupational choices (workers,
formal entrepreneurs, informal entrepreneurs) and endogenous determination of the wage rate.
We study how much of the differences in terms of output per capita and informal sector size are ex-
plained by differences in terms of barriers to entry in the formal sector and the level of enforcement of
legally binding contracts, between the reference economy (the United States) and other economies
under study (Southern Europe and Latin America). Our quantitative conclusions allow us to estimate
how much the economies under study would gain if their barriers to entry and the level of contract en-
forcement were changed to the United States level.
Weconcludethat:i)barrierstoentrydoabetterjobthanthelevelofcontractenforcementatexplaining
the observeddifferencesbetweenthe UnitedStates andSouthernEuropein terms of the informalsec-
tor size; ii) for developing countries (such as Peru), however, the two factors have comparable impor-
tance; iii) the two factors do not explain a large fraction of the observed variation of output per capita
across the economies under study.
These conclusions have important policy consequences. One is that, for instance in the Portuguese
economy, a large informal sector suggests the existence of large barriers to formal sector operation,
which might be explicit (taxes or fees on the creation of new firms) or implicit (delays in project ap-
proval, a long lapse of time betweenlegal registration and formal operationof firms, insufficient advan-
tagesofformalactivity,corruption,etc.). Awaytoincreaseefficiencywouldbetoreducethesecosts.In
a favourable scenario and in the very long run, that would mean the reduction of the informal sector
size to 10 or 15 percent, and a reduction between half and a third in the difference between the Portu-
guese official output per capita and its United States level (whichcorrespondsto a reduction of about a
fifth in the differencebetweenthe twoeconomiesif weconsiderbothsectors). This processwouldcon-
sist, essentially, of a shift of firm activity from the informal to the formal sector.
3
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL ECONOMY
Let us consider a small open economywitha large number of agents. Each agent represents a house-
hold which perpetuates itself across generations. After living for a given period of time, each agent
leaves a successor.
At the beginning of his life, the agent is endowedwith a given ability level as an entrepreneur, x, and a
personal level of wealthleft as bequest by the previous generation,b. The agent’s inheritance is deter-
mined by his predecessor’s decisions, but his level of entrepreneurial ability is random and does not
depend on his predecessor’s. The link between generations is determined only through inheritanceb.
In each generation, agents are all born simultaneously, and they all have the same lifespan. Each
agent has a utility function given by
  Ucb c b ,   
   1
where c is lifetime consumption,  b is the bequest left to the next generation, and  is a parameter be-
tween 0 and 1 that defines how much of the agent’s lifetime income is consumed or left to the next
generation.
Production is done using work and capital. Given the agent’s capacity as an entrepreneur, x, his pro-
duction function will be given by
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3 For a detailed description of the economic model and the results obtained, see Antunes and Cavalcanti (2006). ykn x kn , 
	 ,
wherek is the amount of capital used in production and n is the number of workers hired in the labour
market. Parameters  and	 lie between 0 and 1 and define the weight of each input in production. In
order to have positive profits, restriction 	 
 1must hold. The good produced using this technology
may be consumed, used as capital, or left to the next generation.
The capital market is organised as follows. First, we admit that financial intermediaries (which we can
define as banks) lend money exclusively to entrepreneurs in the formal sector so as to finance their
projects. To make things simpler, we shall assume that banks have access to external financial mar-
kets at the fixed and exogenous interest rater, and the intermediation margin is zero. Given that each
agentactsinhisownbestinterest,contractswillbedesignedinawaythatentrepreneursprefertohon-
our them rather than defaulting. To model such environment, we need to know the agent’s income in
case of default, as well as when the entrepreneur repays the loan. In the first case, the agent does not
pay interest but looses all capital presented as collateral; moreover, he suffers a punishment propor-
tional to the output of his firm net of labour costs. The punishment will be larger the larger the level of
contractenforcementimposedbyofficialinstitutions.Inthesecondcase,theagentrepaystheinterest,
keeps his capital and is not punished.
We admit perfect mobility of labour across sectors, implying that the wage rate in the formal and infor-
mal sectors is the same. Let us designate it byw. The profit net of labour costs of an entrepreneur with
ability x investingk is
      kxw ykn w n
n ,, m a x ,   1 ,
where  is the tax rate paid by the entrepreneur by each hired worker. We assume that the fiscal reve-
nue is used to maintain the infrastructure of the economy.
Each formal sector entrepreneur’s income, expressed in end-of-period units of the final good, is equal
to
      al x w ral     ,, 1 ,
wherer is the interest rate over the entire period,a is the self-financedpart of capital usinghis bequest,
l is the loan amount, and  is the cost of entry in the formal sector, under the form of taxes and legal
fees, as well as bribes and other costs incurred in order to operate in the formal sector.
The restriction that it is in the entrepreneur’s best interest to repay his loan must ensure that the entre-
preneur never chooses to default, meaning that his lifetime income his higher if he repaysthe loan. Let
us call the fraction of   kxw ,, that the agent looses in case of default – his punishment.This param-
eter reflects the capacity of authorities to enforce contracts, since the higher its value, the larger the
fraction of the entrepreneur’s profit that authorities are able to seize. Each agent willhave a credit limit
given by expression
            al x w ral al x w r a         ,, ,, 11 1 .
The left-hand member of this inequalityis the entrepreneur’s income if he operatesin the formal sector
and honours his debt, as we saw. The right-hand member is the income that the agent gets in case he
defaults: the first term,   1 al x w ,, , is the portion of profit net of labour costs that authorities are
not able to seize after default, and the second,   1 ra , is the loss of capital given as collateral. Ab-
sent from the right-hand member of the inequalityarel, since the agent does not repay the loan, and,
because he switches to the informal sector and does not have to pay the costs of operating in the for-
mal sector. The optimization problem of the entrepreneur, therefore, is to find a non-negative value for
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4a andl so as to maximize is income subject to the restriction of non-default that wehave just seen, and
to the constraint that self-finance must not exceed inheritance, ab  . Let us define  Vbx w f ,, as the
maximum income of a formal sector entrepreneur with inheritance b and entrepreneurial ability x,
given that the equilibriumwagerate isw. Since contracts are self-enforcing, in equilibriumthere are no
defaults.
The income of an informal sector entrepreneur is given by
    axw ra ,,  1 .
If the entrepreneur operates in the informal sector, he will not pay taxes or the costs of operating for-
mally. He will not be able to borrow, so the incentive restriction for not defaulting does not apply. Given
that the agent must rely solely on his inheritance to start up an informal sector firm, his only restriction
isab  . Let use designate the maximum income of an informal sector entrepreneur with inheritanceb
and entrepreneurial ability x, given that the equilibrium wage rate isw,b y  Vbxw l ,, .
The agent’s total wealth will be the value of his inheritance plus his lifetime income, either as an entre-
preneurorasaworker. The agent’s totalwealth,inend-of-periodunits oftheconsumptiongood,willbe
given by
    Y wV bxw Vbxw rb Fl   max , , , , , , 1 .
The agent’s utility function implies that he will consume fraction  ofY and will leave    bY 1  to the
next generation.
Theagent’soccupationalchoicewilldependonhispair bx , andtheequilibriumwageratew.Figure1
depicts occupational choice in the bx , space for a given level of the wagerate. For values of x below
a certain threshold,  xw
* , the agent will choose to become worker, since his ability is low. Above that
value, the agent might workbecausehe has insufficient bequest in order to start a businessand obtain
a sufficiently high credit limit. The agents withhigher abilityoperate in the formal sector (since they are
able to borrow large amounts of resources, thereby exploring all their ability as entrepreneurs). For in-
termediate levels of ability and moderate or high inheritance, agents might prefer to operate in the
informal sector.
3. EQUILIBRIUM
The shape of the distributionof the entrepreneurialabilityx is an important driver of the final results. In
this study we normalise x to interval [0, 1] and assume that the cumulative distribution function is
  xx 
1
, whereisapositiveparameter. Whenthevalueof isalotlargerthan1, inequalityinthedis-
tribution of x is large, with few agents with very low x; when its value is much smaller than 1, inequality
islarge,withfewverygoodentrepreneurs;whenitsvalueis1,x isuniformlydistributed.This functional
form for the distribution of x has been used in the literature because it is simple and has good
adherence to data on earnings and wealth.
Given the cumulative distribution of bequests at the beginning of the period,   b , the equilibrium of
the economy is defined as a pair   wb ,   of a wage rate and a bequest distribution for the next gen-
eration such that:
• All agents do their occupational choices and investment decisions (for those that become
entrepreneurs) optimally, according to the rules that we saw.
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5￿ The wage rate is such that the labour demand (in the formal and the informal sector) equals
supply. In mathematical terms, this means that the number of agents in the lightest shaded
area of Figure 1 should equal that of the two darkest shaded areas of the figure.
Antunes and Cavalcanti (2006) show that, after some generations, the equilibrium wage rate and the
bequestdistributionremain unchanged,that is,      bb , andw does not changefrom one genera-
tionto theother. This doesnotmeanthatthemembersof thesamefamilyhavealwaysthesameinher-
itance; it meansthat theymight changeoccupationandincome,but in aggregateterms the distribution
remains unchanged. Furthermore, they show that such stationary equilibrium is unique, that is, it does
not depend on the initial wealth distribution. All the simulations carried out in what follows correspond
to the stationary equilibrium.
4. QUANTITATIVE EXERCISES
As a starting point, we choose the United States economy as the baseline, and for that reason we are
going to parameterize the model in such a waythat it reproduces some key facts of that economy. The
most relevant parameters for our analysis are the cost of formal sector operation (under the form of
taxes, legal fees, bribes and other implicit costs), the level of contract enforcement, and the inequality
parameter in the entrepreneurial ability distribution (respectively, , , and ). These three values are
determined so as to make the entry costs in the formal sector equal to 0.5 percent of the official Gross
Domestic Product per capita (a value obtained by Djankov et al., 2002), the informal sector size is
around 10 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, and the percentage of entrepreneurs in the active
population is around 9 percent.
4
Table 2 presents some values of interest for the American economy, as wellas the results of the model
when we change some of the parameters. Beyond the informal sector size and the percentage of en-
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Figure 1
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE OF AGENTS
4 In the appendix we present the values of all parameters, as well as a justification for the value used.trepreneurs,thetablealsoshowstheincomeGiniindexobtainedusingthemodel.This isameasureof
inequality in income distribution. A low value of the index corresponds to a more equal distribution; a
high value identifies high inequality.
5 In part (a) we see that if we lower the level of contract enforce-
ment (all other things equal), the informal sector size increases, as wellas the percentage of entrepre-
neursinthe activepopulation.Althoughinequalityinincomedistributionfalls, officialincomepercapita
falls faster. Total income falls but not as fast. Howcan weinterpret these results? What happensis that
the credit limit decreases whenthe level of enforcement (measured by) decreases. Manyagents that
werepreviouslyoperating in the formal sector are forced to switchto the informal sector; others simply
become workers. This in turn increases labour supply, thus reducing wages. The increase in the per-
centage of entrepreneurs means that there are more entrepreneurs in the economy but on average
with lower production – although their ability as entrepreneurs remains the same! Income decreases
uniformly for all agents, and in net terms inequality decreases.
The impactofanincreaseinthecostsofformaloperation,whichwecanobserveinpart(b),leadstoan
increase in the informal sector size and the percentage of entrepreneurs, and to a reduction in official
and total output. The increaseof the informal sector is expected:if formal operationbecomesmore ex-
pensive, many entrepreneurs substitute it by informal operation. Some agents become workers, thus
reducing wagesand making it more attractive to operate informally. The net effect is an increase in the
number of entrepreneurs.
We can use this model as an economic analysistool. An interesting experiment is the following.Let us
think of the American economy as the baseline and ask the question – for example, what would the
United States income per capita be if a given parameter were equal to that of economy X, all other
things unchanged? The answer allowsus to have an idea of the extent to which that parameter is able
to explainthe observed differences betweenthe American economyand economyX. Table 3 contains
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Baseline (US) 10 100 100 9 34
Part (a)
Change on the punishment in case of default parameter, 
From the baseline value to:
Half  /2 29 79 67 10.8 33
A quarter  /4 59 69 40 11.5 30
A eighth  /8 90 60 19 11.6 25
Part (b)
Change on the regulation parameter, ,
From the baseline value to:
Half 2 10.5 99.6 99.2 9.1 33
A quarter 4 11.1 99 98 9.2 33
Eight time 8 13.5 97.8 95.2 9.3 33
Fonte: Antunes e Cavalcanti (2006).
5 The numbers shown are low when compared to those in the American economy, which lie above 40 percent. However, we are only interested in their
variation. On this issue, see Antunes and Cavalcanti (2006).the result of this exercise for two types of economy: a “Southern Europe economy”, and the Peruvian
economy (which epitomises Latin-American economies).
6 The main difference between these two
types of economy is the level of income per capita, while Southern Europe is substantially different
from the American economy in terms of the informal sector size.
The baseline economy (the United States) displays an informal sector size of 10 percent of the Gross
Domestic Product. The fraction of profits taken from the entrepreneur in case of default that is consis-
tent with American data is 25 percent (that is, parameter is 0.25), and the cost of entry in the formal
sector is 0.5 percent of the official output per capita (that is, / y is 0.005, wherey is official income per
capita
7).
We estimate that the Southern European economy has an official income per capita of around 55 per-
cent of the American level. (Includingthe informal sector, this number is 62 percent.) The informal sec-
tor attains 24 percent. The fraction profits seized by authorities, , is 0.209, while entry costs, / y, are
18 percent. In the case of Peru, the official incomeper capita is 8 percentof the Americanlevel. The in-
formal sector is as high as 60 percent. Estimates for and / y are 0.13 and 20 percent, respectively.
8
Let us look first at Southern Europe. If instead of using the punishment for default, , for the United
States we feed in the Southern Europe value, we see that the informal sector increases to 13.4 per-
cent, whileofficialoutputpercapita falls9 percent.If weonlyincreasethe operationcosts inthe formal
sector,  / y, the informal economy climbs to 25 percent and official output falls 18 percent, which are
closer to those observed empirically (respectively, 24 percent and 45 percent). The level of regulation
forformaloperationdoesabetterjobatexplainingthedifferencesobservedbetweenSouthernEurope
and the United States than the abilityto enforce credit contracts. This suggests that bureaucraticineffi-
ciency and barriers to entry in the formal sector is more acute than access to credit in Southern Euro-
pe. Changing both parameters, the model underestimates the informal sector size (31 against 24
percent)andoverestimatesoutputpercapita (72percentof the Americanlevelinthe modelagainst55
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Table 3
SIMULATIONS FOR THE “SOUTHERN EUROPE ECONOMY” AND PERU










Baseline (US) 0.25 0.005 10 100 100
Southern Europe (data) 0.209 0.18 24 62 55
Model predictions:
Contract enforcement   0.209 0.005 13.4 94 91
Regulation   0.25 0.18 25 94 82
Both 0.209 0.18 31 87 72
Peru (data) 0.13 0.2 60 11 8
Model predictions:
Contract enforcement   0.13 0.005 28 81 68
Regulation   0.25 0.2 27 93 79
Both 0.13 0.2 63 74 41
Fonte: Antunes e Cavalcanti (2006).
6 The Southern Europe economy is a synthesis of the economies of Italy, Portugal and Spain.
7 Given the normalizations that we performed in terms of x and the production function, the value of is 0.0004. 7
8 The estimates are calculated for the late 1990s. For values of  and / y, see La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2002). 8percent in the data). This means that other factors should explain the difference in difference – quality
of infrastructure, utilization of technology, education, size of the economy, taxes, etc.
From the previous exercise we see that the model is able to account for a little over half the gap be-
tween the Southern European economy and the United States: the gap predicted by the model is 28
pp; the actual gap is 45pp. While other differences between the American economy and Southern Eu-
ropecertainlyexist,eveninthecontextofthismodel,
9 thisresultshowsthatthegainsintermsoftheof-
ficial output per capita stemming from the elimination of barriers to formal operation (under the form of
bureaucratic costs, regulation costs, and other costs, includingcorruption) and, to a lesser degree, the
efficiencyin the enforcement of contracts, might be, in the long run, very large. Starting from the situa-
tion where both parameters have the Southern European value, and changing the parameters to the
baseline level, the model predicts a rise of 19 pp in the level of the official output per capita as a per-
centage of the baseline level (from 72 percent of the baseline level to 91 percent, a little less than half
the observed gap), and to a decrease of the informal sector from 31 to 13.4 percent. This case is inter-
esting in that it suggests that the costs of regulation and entry in the formal sector encourages people
operating in the informal sector to switch to the formal sector, as can be seen by the fact that the in-
crease in total output being just 7 pp (from 87 percent of the baseline level to 94 percent). As we lower
the regulation costs, more entrepreneurs will find it profitable to operate in the formal sector. With ac-
cess to credit, they will be able to expand their projects. This, in turn, will increase labour demand and,
consequently, the wage rate. Finally, higher wages might encourage some informal entrepreneurs to
leave their current occupation and become workers. The informal sector shrinks through these two
effects. In this process, some firms might simply disappear for not being competitive in the formal
sector. But most remain competitive and operate legally.
For the case of Peru, a typical Latin America economy with low income per capita and a large informal
sector, we see that the model explains fairly well the informal sector size, but again does not account
for the total difference to the United States level. The simulation suggests that the contribution of the
two factors under study is comparable.
Asisusual,onemustlookattheseresultscarefully. First, thecalculationsareforatimespanofatleast
35 years. Second, the parameters whose variations we analysed may capture effects different from
formal operation costs and the ability to enforce contracts. Specifically, formal operation costs also
captureanyfiscal component(other than the payrolltaxexplicitlymodelled)affecting productioncosts.
Correlation betweenparameters may also occur. For instance, a legal system good enough to enforce
contracts (a high ) should also be able to punish officials that ask for bribes, thus reducing formaliza-
tion costs (a low). Finally, other factors not included in the model may interact in complicated ways
with the model variables and counter the effects that we obtained.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Using a general equilibrium model with occupational choice among workers, entrepreneurs in the for-
mal sector andentrepreneursin the informalsector, weshowthat the differencesbetweensome econ-
omies in terms of the informal sector size may be explained by differences in the costs of operating
formally (under the form of administrative fees, including taxes, bureaucratic costs, bribes and corrup-
tion costs) and in the ability of authorities at enforcing credit contracts by punishing defaulters effec-
tively. These two factors, however, do not explain the differences in income per capita observed in the
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9 Beyond the differences between  and ,other potential differences in terms of the parameters pertainingto taxes, the productionfunction and the ability
distribution function, may arise. Separate exercises suggest that, for reasonable values of these parameters, our conclusions are still valid. In the case
wheretheweightofcapitalintheproductionfunctionislarger(alessprobable,albeitpossible,scenario),themodeltendstoattachmoreimportancetothe
level of contract enforcement. 9data. In the Portuguese case, a reduction in the costs of operating formally to the United States level
wouldoriginate,in the longrun, a reductionin the informalsector size to half the current value, and to a
reduction between a third and half the gap between the Portuguese output per capita and that of the
United States. These figures, of course, should be interpreted as estimates conditional on a set of
working hypotheses.
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Annex
CALIBRATION OF THE BASELINE ECONOMY
Parameter Value Comments
 0.8 Estimated by Laitner and Juster (1996)
	 0.55 Weight of labour in production, based on Gollin (2002)
 0.35 Weight of capital in production, based on Gollin (2002)
r 1 Yearly real interest rate of 2% (for a 35-year period)
 0.33 Tax rate on labour, based on Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993)
 0.0004 Formalisation costs, based on estimates by Djankov et al. (2002)
 0.25 Informal sector size of 10%, according to Schneider and Enste (2000)
 6 9% of total population are entrepreneurs, based on Quadrini (1999)
Fonte: Antunes e Cavalcanti (2006).